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Introduction 
There have been few more influential figures in the Anglophone study of political 
thought in recent years than Quentin Skinner. Among the many features that 
characterised his energetic initial writings—in the late 1960s and early 1970s—was 
his comfort in writing both as a historian of philosophy and as a philosopher of 
history. As well as offering path-breaking interpretations of the intellectual context of 
seventeenth century writers like Hobbes, Skinner also offered a distinct, often 
controversial, methodological programme rooted in claims about the nature of 
historical understanding. His unique strand of linguistic contextualism—which he 
suggested was indebted to Collingwood, Wittgenstein and Austin—has undeniably 
had a transformative effect on how intellectual historians conceive of their craft. In 
the early 1980s, he began to speak in another scholarly voice: that of political theorist, 
as he engaged in a project of ‘excavating’ and defending a neo-classical 
understanding of human liberty, which, he argued, was popular among early-modern 
republicans but then usurped by a modern liberal alternative.
2
  
His excavation of republican liberty—and the fusion of historical enquiry and 
abstract philosophical analysis it involves—has continued to dominate his recent work 
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at the expense of any concern with the philosophy of history. His only contribution to 
philosophical debates about issues in historical understanding has been a collated 
edition of his earlier articles in revised form, entitled Regarding Method. In this 
article, I suggest that this book is more important than it might otherwise appear and 
that this is partly because of the revisions that Skinner makes to his original 
contentions. Rather than focus mainly on the philosophical problems with the revised 
version of his contextualism
3
, the three main themes I explore in this article are: first, 
the nature of recent developments in his thought; second, what might be termed the 
theoretical and political ambitions these developments reveal; and third, why these 
ambitions appear unsustainable. I begin by suggesting that Regarding Method reveals 
Skinner as the only figure of his generation still determined to justify an exclusively 
linguistic contextualist method of historical understanding. I then go on to discuss the 
way in which his methodology is now recast along anti-foundationalist lines and how 
this plays out in his representation of the historian as ‘archaeologist’ interested in 
‘rhetorical redescription’. After this, I move on to assess Skinner’s attempt to present 
contextualism as a distinct critical approach to political philosophy, which I suggest is 
less than convincing.  
 
Skinner’s Contextualism Recapitulated 
Mark Bevir has offered a critical, historicized reading of ‘Cambridge School’ 
linguistic contextualism, which stresses the intellectual background that framed its 
emergence. Herein, he argues that the lack of recent methodological interventions 
from its best-known proponents is revelatory of its historical specificity and also 
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points to its philosophical weaknesses.
4
 As Bevir correctly observes, the once 
trenchant methodological defences of contextualism advanced by its two best-known 
proponents—Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock—have not been readily forthcoming in 
recent years.
5
 The plausible conclusion he reaches is that this represents a ‘retreat 
from strong methodological claims’.
6
  But arguably there has been no such substantial 
retreat by the adherents of contextualism. Most of the evidence for such a retreat 
concerns the silence from the initial advocates of contextualism. It is true that, while 
there have been a large number of historical studies completed by both Pocock and 
Skinner in the last twenty years, this period has not seen any systematic defence of 
their interpretive principles or response to their numerous critics. Nor have the first, 
second or third generations of contextualist scholars really taken up the cudgels on 
their behalf. In the case of Pocock the silence is probably beyond any dispute: he 
notes in the recent reissue of The Machiavellian Moment that he has not made any 
statements on method for over twenty years.
7
 His silence is perhaps not so surprising, 
since his methodological writing has seemed to be comprised of evolving reflections 
on his historical practice. This accounts both for its piecemeal presentation and its 
sudden, unexplained shifts in loyalty towards concepts, something exemplified by his 
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short-lived commitment to the Kuhnian ‘paradigm’.
8
 Moreover, Pocock often tends 
towards an account of the emergence of contextualism that stresses its historical 
specificity as a movement rather than any philosophical unity it might be thought to 
possess.
9
 When viewed now, his work fits well into Bevir’s historicized account of 
contextualism that views it not as an attempt to build a coherent programme, but 
rather as something philosophically fragmented. 
However, if silence is to be considered evidence of a meaningful recantation 
of methodological precepts, it cannot be attributed so neatly to Skinner. As noted, it is 
true that Skinner has not published many completely new writings either on the 
philosophy of history in general or on narrower methodological issues in the last 
twenty years.
10
 And it is also true that his historical practice has moved in such a way 
as to clearly imply some repudiation of his strictest contextualist claims; most 
obviously in his recent tendency to utilise past political thought in contemporary 
philosophical debates, something that flies in the face of his earliest methodological 
arguments.
11
 Nevertheless, Skinner has actually been quite defiant in the 
representation of his methodological work; and part of this defiance amounts to a 
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resistance to any historicized account of its importance. Indeed, his most recent foray 
into methodological debates shows his committed rejection of any reading of his 
project as historically limited. Regarding Method is comprised of revised versions of 
previously published essays, some of them dating back as far as the 1960s. But their 
republication is clearly not intended to function as some sort of historical document, 
something suggested by the fact that they have been revised at all. Skinner justifies 
their publication on the grounds that ‘they continue to be discussed in the scholarly 
literature’ and remain of philosophical relevance.
12
 His stated aim is to offer an 
‘articulation and defence’ of his methodological programme, a programme that he 
summarises with the following contention: ‘if we are to write the history of ideas in a 
properly historical style, we need to situate the texts we study within such intellectual 
contexts and frameworks of discourse as enable us to recognise what their authors 
were doing in writing them’.
13
 
The nature of Regarding Method thus strongly suggests that Skinner has not 
dropped the strong methodological claims that characterised his early work. This, 
taken together with the silence of others, means that insofar as contextualism has a 
present existence, this is it. But it is arguably not only contextualism’s present but also 
its future. It seems likely that emerging scholars working on contextualist intellectual 
histories will forego a trawl through various journals and edited collections to find 
Skinner’s articles from the 1960s and 70s, when looking for a methodological 
justification for their favoured interpretive approach, simply because Regarding 
Method provides the most useful digest of his thought. It is his particular 
methodological defence of contextualism that is likely to be what aspiring 
contextualist intellectual historians regard as the single philosophical justification for 
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and explanation of their craft and therefore might actually be Skinner’s legacy in the 
philosophy of history.  
 
From Detective to Archaeologist: Skinner’s Anti-Foundationalist Turn 
The most striking recent development in Skinner’s methodological writing has been 
the ostensibly anti-foundationalist turn it has taken. Though many of the details of the 
method he defends remain the same, the way in which it is presented and justified has 
actually shifted quite dramatically. Its presentation has moved from an interest in 
speech-act theory seemingly reliant on traditional objectivist assumptions about the 
nature of an interpretive method, to an explicitly anti-foundationalist concern with 
‘rhetorical redescription’ and the social utility of the historical studies such a concern 
enables. This is evident from his vision of the historian as ‘archaeologist’ committed 
not to the discovery of historical facts but rather to the ‘excavation’ of alien concepts 
justified with reference to the political use of such an excavation.  
The classic expression of the deductive method employed by Sherlock Holmes 
is his oft-quoted declaration that ‘when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth’.
14
 Holmes’ dictum can be plausibly 
understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it can be understood as something 
akin to ‘Ockham’s Razor’, a mere motto, one that advises people to keep to the most 
basic evidential elements when constructing a hypothesis and avoid constructing 
elaborate theories when they are not required. But on the other, the dictum can be 
interpreted as something approaching an exclusivist methodological claim. It seems 
that in his early work Skinner conceives of the role of the historian as something akin 
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to a detective bound by the latter understanding of Holmes’s dictum and thus offers a 
particular method capable of revealing historical facts. 
This is because Skinner claims that adequate historical understanding depends 
on the use of speech act theory: the insight that individual locutions are necessarily 
performative utterances; when individuals say things, they do things in the process, 
like warning, declaring, promising and so on.
15
 His claim is that grasping the meaning 
of an utterance requires a grasp of its illocutionary force: it is necessary to understand 
not just what the individuals words themselves mean (in a semantic sense) but instead 
what an actor was doing in saying such words to a particular person on a particular 
occasion. So, in one of his most favoured examples, Skinner refers to Machiavelli’s 
statement that ‘mercenary armies always undermine liberty’.
16
 As Skinner notes, 
whilst ‘there is little difficulty about understanding the meaning of the utterance 
itself’, this tells us nothing about what Machiavelli was doing in uttering it, which he 
claims requires focus on the linguistic context that framed its composition.
17
 
In his well-known essay ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, 
first published in 1969, Skinner’s view is that the key to uncovering historical 
meaning lies in determining the conditions of possibility for an individual action to 
have taken place and that these conditions of possibility can be determined through 
the application of a particularistic form of speech-act theory. The claim is that if 
historical texts are properly appreciated as localised speech-acts, the historian can 
reveal the available linguistic conventions to determine the individual’s intention in 
making the utterance. This involves a process of elimination whereby historical 
knowledge of existing conventions excludes certain types of action on the basis that 
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engagement in them is definitively impossible. So, the ‘appropriate method’ for 
historical understanding is one where historians 
‘delineate the whole range of communications which could have been 
conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given 
utterance and, next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and [the] 
wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the 
given writer’.
18
 
 
According to Skinner, this process comprises the ‘necessary conditions for the 
understanding of utterances’.
19
  
On this basis, the historian can approach the writings of historical thinkers and 
exclude certain interpretations of them as definitively anachronistic. Anachronisms 
are here understood as a category of erroneous interpretation that arises whenever 
historians ascribe to individuals intentions that they were incapable of holding. One 
example that Skinner uses to illustrate this concerns the political thought of John 
Locke, which he argues cannot be correctly interpreted or described it as ‘liberal’.
20
 
Crucially, the basis he provides for regarding this interpretation or description as 
incorrect does not have anything to do with evidence about Locke’s political thought 
itself. It has nothing to do with any particular feature of Locke’s writings, nothing to 
do with whether aspects of his thought are not plausibly describable as liberal—for 
example, his belief that no political society should extend toleration to atheists. 
Skinner’s charge of anachronism is not based on any substantive analysis of Locke’s 
ideas but rather the historical conditions of possibility necessary for the interpretive 
claim to be considerable in the first place. The reason that Locke’s writings are 
illegitimately describable as ‘liberal’ is, for Skinner, that it is impossible to identify 
the conventional intention of wishing to advance a liberal political theory, because 
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such a convention was not yet in linguistic existence. As with the strong reading of 
Holmes’s dictum, the conventionalist method defended in Skinner’s early writing is 
committed to a vision of understanding history that depended on eliminating the 
impossible to reveal the facts of the matter at hand.  
His conventionalist approach that involves ‘decoding’ an individual’s 
utterance seems more than just an interpretive technique that any historian can 
legitimately opt to discard and still reach valid interpretive conclusions. Rather 
Skinner gestures towards presenting his method as one capable of establishing an 
objectively true interpretation of a text. This is because, as he puts it, understanding 
and identifying the linguistic conventions available to an author is a ‘necessary 
condition’ for comprehending her utterance. Skinner certainly does not describe it as a 
sufficient condition: he does not say that identifying all the linguistic conventions 
available to an author provides a guaranteed route to correct interpretation. But, 
nevertheless, in labelling the knowledge of linguistic conventions a necessary 
condition of understanding, he does maintain that any successful route—regardless of 
the particular method used therein—will definitely require a conventionalist analysis. 
Without knowledge of all of the range of conventional communications that Locke 
could have engaged in, sound interpretation is impossible, even if such knowledge 
does not absolutely guarantee successful interpretation.
21
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 Skinner’s claims about the nature of correct interpretation remain largely 
unchanged in the revised versions of his various essays.
22
 Yet Regarding Method 
reveals a rejection of the foundations that would seem necessary to underpin this 
approach to historical understanding. In one of the newer essays in the volume, 
Skinner rejects the master/apprentice model of historical training outlined by Geoffrey 
Elton, especially its assumption that ‘the proper task of the historian is simply to 
uncover the facts about the past and recount them as objectively as possible’.
23
 
Skinner’s critique of Elton involves two key claims: (1) a rejection of his commitment 
to objectivity in historical enquiry and (2) a rejection of his view of why historical 
enquiry might be thought an important activity. The first claim, which concerns 
Elton’s alleged subscription to ‘the cult of the fact’ that reveals Skinner’s newfound 
adherence to anti-foundationalism.
24
 According to Skinner ‘scarcely anyone 
nowadays believes in the possibility of building up structures of factual knowledge on 
foundations purporting to be wholly independent of our judgements’ and because of 
this the objectivist approach associated with Elton is ‘untenable’.
25
 This rejection of 
foundationalism indicates a shift in Skinner’s because some commitment to 
objectivity seems implicit in his account of a method that stipulates the necessary 
conditions for historical understanding. Any claim about the necessary conditions of 
understanding grounds objective knowledge in ways that is difficult to square with 
any denial of the existence of facts in the way Skinner seems determined to in 
offering what he describes as a ‘post-empiricist critique’.
26
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The second claim about the social value of the historian—though no doubt 
rather uninteresting as a statement in the philosophy of history—actually connects to a 
quite important further development in his thought. For Skinner, Elton provides an 
impoverished account of the nature of history as an area of academic enquiry because 
it stresses the necessity of scholarly technique over broader social purposes. Unlike 
Elton, for whom the purpose of historical studies can be reduced to features intrinsic 
to the practice—like ‘the intellectual training’ it provides—for Skinner its purpose is 
to make ‘a contribution to the understanding of our present social world’ and, 
correspondingly, to check any tendency to ‘fall under the spell of our own intellectual 
heritage’.
27
 For Skinner, the study of history ‘can help to liberate us from the grip of 
any one hegemonal account of those values and how they should be interpreted and 
understood’.
28
 ‘History’, he suggests, has ‘the power to transform us, to help us think 
more effectively about our society and its possible need for reform and reformation’.
29
 
 This stress on the social value of historical enquiry might be thought neither 
remarkable in itself nor a particularly dramatic development in Skinner’s thought. It 
could perhaps be read just as a fairly innocuous dig at Elton’s conservative suspicion 
of all theoretical reflection and a response to the charge of antiquarianism that 
Skinner’s own contextualism has occasionally faced.
30
 But when considered alongside 
the first claim—that Elton’s approach reveals a naïve belief in objective knowledge 
and an adherence to the ‘cult of the fact’—it becomes more significant. As Skinner 
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notes, his proposed rejection of traditional empiricism facilitates a particular vision of 
the historian: that of an ‘archaeologist’ whose objective is to excavate ideas from the 
past, ‘bringing buried intellectual treasure back to the surface’, the ‘alien character’ of 
which can expose us to different ways of thinking.
31
  
In his recent book, Liberty Before Liberalism, Skinner suggests that his vision of 
the historian as archaeologist is an allusion to the work of Michel Foucault, a figure 
that is absent from his early work but now looms large as an intellectual influence. 
Although James Tully has often written of parallels in the work of Skinner and 
Foucault, there actually appears to have been little in common between the two.
32
 
What most obviously differentiates them is that the former has always appeared to 
privilege the author as a locus of analysis whereas the latter often appears to reduce 
authorial voice to constitutive discursive practices or regimes.
33
 Nevertheless, in his 
recent work Skinner has embraced this alleged theoretical link. Linked to this 
embrace of Foucault is an embrace of Nietzsche, another thinker absent from 
Skinner’s earlier work but now invoked as an important influence on his thought.
34
  
 The Nietzschean/Foucauldian influence appears most substantively in 
Skinner’s account of the ‘ideological’ underpinnings of moral and political argument. 
He claims that past political texts should be regarded as having been composed by 
‘innovating ideologists’.
35
 These ‘innovating ideologists’ are individuals who attempt 
to rhetorically manipulate key terms through ‘sleights of hand’ in order to serve 
specific political strategies in the awareness that ‘it is in large part by the rhetorical 
manipulation of these terms that any society succeeds in establishing, upholding, 
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questioning or altering its moral identity’.
36
 It is in outlining this account of the 
‘innovating ideologist’—who seeks to rhetorically manipulate key moral terms for 
strategic political ends—that Skinner declares his ‘allegiance to one particular 
tradition of twentieth-century social thought’, one that ‘may perhaps be said to stem 
from Nietzsche’.
37
  
One of the effects of this turn towards Nietzsche and away from a seemingly 
foundationalist commitment to historical facts retrievable through a conventionalist 
method has been a corresponding reconfiguration of his use of speech-act theory, 
which has been refashioned to prioritise a concern with ‘rhetorical redescription’, the 
process through which innovating ideologists act to change the meanings of important 
political terms for their own ends. Skinner notes how words that once held negative 
connotations like ‘ambition’ or ‘patriot’ have been rendered either neutral or positive 
designations thanks to individual manipulation.
38
 This phenomenon is exemplified, he 
suggests, by Nietzsche’s analysis of the triumph of Christian slave morality in The 
Genealogy of Morals.
39
 He further insists that such redescriptions suggest a more 
general philosophical point, arguing—again seemingly along generalised Nietzschean 
lines—that the purpose of moral and political argument can be reduced to an 
individual’s strategic objectives in making it. This does not appear to be the weaker 
claim that individuals will, on occasions, behave in such a strategic manner, but rather 
the stronger claim that they will always do so: for Skinner, the use of evaluative 
political terms ‘will always reflect a wish to impose a particular moral vision on the 
workings of the social world’.
40
 The methodological upshot of this is that a previously 
broad theoretical concern with illocutionary force and what an individual might have 
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been doing in uttering (like declaring, promising etc) has been replaced with a much 
narrower interest in the purely ideological use of speech and the way evaluative 
language can be used to legitimate the activities of individuals and groups.  
 
Conceptual History and Critique: Contextualism as Political Theory 
Regardless of whether these recent developments in Skinner’s thought—the explicit 
anti-foundationalist rejection of objectivity, the stress on the social value of historical 
enquiry and the interest in narrow strategic rhetoric rather than a wide repertoire of 
speech-acts—can be comfortably reconciled with his earlier arguments, they have 
allowed him to present his contextualism as something more than just an argument 
about the nature of history. These developments seem in fact to be part of an attempt 
to represent contextualism as something beyond a philosophy of history. This can be 
shown through an examination of how contextualism has been conceived (by Skinner 
and some of his followers) as a distinct, critical approach to political philosophy. 
Despite the indefatigable campaign by historian Melvin Richter to bring it to 
the fore, the methodological impact of the German conceptual history 
(Begriffsgeschichte) project—associated with Reinhart Koselleck—on Anglophone 
scholarship has been negligible, especially in comparison to Cambridge school 
contextualism.
41
 On the few occasions when it has been taken seriously as involving 
substantive methodological claims, they are usually thought problematic. This is 
largely because philosophers have regarded ‘concepts’ as at best inadequate and at 
worst implausible units for historical analysis, especially compared with alternatives 
such as languages, ideas, practices and traditions. But apart from any theoretical 
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problems this approach, commentators have noted the logical incompatibility between 
the conceptual history project conceived by Koselleck and his followers and the 
linguistic contextualism defended by Skinner.
42
  
Part of this incompatibility relates to the fact that the Begriffsgeschichte 
project is really a form of social history, whereas the contextualism of the Cambridge 
School has insisted on bracketing off all analysis of the social in favour of the 
linguistic. But more seriously, if, as Skinner argues, there can be no ‘perennial 
problems’ in the history of ideas and if understanding the meaning of an utterance 
requires treating it as a particularistic speech-act incapable of abstraction from its 
locality, then the history of concepts cannot be studied at all. Concepts cannot, on 
such a particularistic understanding, actually have histories because they will always 
be reducible to their very discrete deployment. Thus, Skinner declared in his early 
writing that any attempts at ‘tracing the morphology of a given concept over time’ are 
‘necessarily misconceived’.
43
 This is a position that is reiterated, albeit more softly, in 
Regarding Method: even with the move away towards rhetorical description, he 
insists that he ‘remain[s] sceptical about the value of writing histories of concepts’.
44
  
Yet in a surprising development in the final chapter entitled ‘Retrospect: 
Studying rhetoric and conceptual change’, Skinner attempts a rapprochement with 
conceptual history and suggests that it and his own contextualism are not only 
logically compatible but are in fact complementary projects. He suggests the only 
difference between the two lies in terms of emphasis: that Koselleck and his followers 
focus on ‘the entire process of conceptual change’ whilst his own is ‘one of the 
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techniques by which it takes place’.
45
 He makes a point of noting that Koselleck’s 
own work had not been an intended target of his early methodological essays; he 
suggests that it could not have been, as he had not actually encountered it.
46
 
Nevertheless, he does not actually explain at all how contextualism and conceptual 
history can be thought compatible at the methodological level. The fact that Koselleck 
was not a target of Skinner’s early critical essays does not explain how an insistence 
on the particularistic understanding of meaning through individual speech-acts could 
ever cohere with an insistence on the tracing of the histories of individual concepts. 
Skinner argues that the two approaches share a certain understanding of the social 
world, specifically how it can be transformed through the contestation of evaluative 
concepts. His contention is that both contextualism and conceptual history ‘assume 
that we need to treat our normative concepts less as statements about the world than 
as tools and weapons of ideological debate’.
47
 But this in itself is not enough to 
sustain any suggestion of compatibility. The issue of incompatibility does not concern 
how we treat our normative concepts but rather whether we regard concepts as the 
kind of autonomous entities that can be traced over time and how that claim (if 
accepted) could ever cohere with Skinner’s speech-act theory. 
Though Skinner does not demonstrate the compatibility of his contextualism 
with Koselleck’s conceptual history, this task has been attempted by Kari Palonen. 
Palonen describes the two approaches as ‘styles’ of political theorizing that each 
embodies a ‘critique of the unhistorical and depoliticising use of concepts’.
48
 And 
Skinner has come to endorse this view: this is because, for him, the contextualist 
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approach to understanding political concepts ‘offers us an additional means of 
reflecting on what we believe, and thus of strengthening our present beliefs by way of 
testing them against alternative possibilities’.
49
 This belief—that a contextualist 
methodology comprises a ‘critical’ theory—has also been advanced by James Tully, 
who suggests it is actually a distinct approach to political philosophy, one that enables 
‘a kind of permanent critique of the relations of meaning, power, and subjectivity in 
which we can think and act politically’.
50
 Thus understood by Skinner, Palonen and 
Tully, contextualism becomes not only a philosophy of history but also a political 
philosophy and one that not only provides the resources for but also actually 
embodies critique. 
Both Palonen and Skinner claim that contextualism represents a specific 
critique of the tradition of normative political theory. In fact Skinner asserts that an 
endorsement of his contextualist ‘vision of politics’ entails that 
‘we place a question-mark against all those neo-Kantian projects of our time in 
which we encounter an aspiration to halt the flux of politics by trying 
definitively to fix the analysis of key moral terms. I continue to harbour a 
special prejudice against those who, in adopting this approach, imagine an 
ideal speech situation in which everyone (everyone?) would make the same 
moral and cognitive judgements’.
51
 
 
This criticism is clearly aimed at the normative concerns at the heart of the work of 
figures like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and their followers. The argument seems to 
be that a contextualist understanding of or approach to history facilitates a certain 
understanding of politics, which acts to undermine normative political theory as a 
project. Normative theory is rendered problematic by its apparent failure to take 
seriously the process of conceptual change. In engaging in abstract debates about the 
nature and demands of key political concepts such as justice or equality, normative 
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political theorists illegitimately try to ‘fix’ the meaning of moral terms, thus ignoring 
the ‘radical contingency’ of our values and the necessarily ideological nature of our 
arguments.
52
 
 There are, however, several problems with this position, problems that 
undermine the ambitions that these scholars have for contextualism as a critical theory 
of politics that challenges other approaches, particularly that of the normative 
tradition. The first is that the criticism of the normative enterprise offered by these 
figures depends on a particular understanding of that enterprise and this understanding 
seems dubious. The contextualist criticism of normative political theory concerns two 
related issues: (1) the supposed failure to take seriously the ‘radical contingency’ of 
the evaluative concepts existing in any society and (2) the attempt to attain some kind 
of Archimedean point of universality and corresponding failure to realise that ‘no one 
is above the battle, because the battle is all there is’.
53
 Both these charges seem to rely 
on mischaracterisations of the nature of normative theory; both how it is practiced and 
how it can be practiced.  
The first charge seems mistaken since it is the fact that our values are radically 
contingent and particular that creates the problem of political conflict that animates 
much normative theory in the first place. Theories of politics such as those offered by 
Rawls, Habermas and their followers generally take the existence of deep conflict 
about moral and political principles as a given.
54
 It is the case that these normative 
political theorists typically deny any thesis of radical incommensurability of moral 
values, but this is not the same thing at all. The incommensurability of moral values 
might pose a threat to the normative project in a way that the mere contingency of 
these values does not. The fact that moral values are subject to spatial and temporal 
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shifts poses no necessary threat to the project of trying to unpack or systematise 
norms to assess the conduct of individuals or governments. The second point also 
relies on a seemingly inaccurate representation of the normative project, since it need 
not involve any appeal to objective universality, but rather to particular political 
communities in which there is scope for agreement on moral principles. The depiction 
of Neo-Kantian normative theorists as ‘dispassionate analysts standing above the 
battle’ thus seems inaccurate.
55
 Rawls, even in his early writing, was explicit that his 
aim in deploying abstract devices such as his ‘original position’ was to ‘make vivid’ 
the intuitions held about moral concepts by individuals within particular societies and 
then to systematise them into meaningful principles rather than to deduce them from 
some realm of total abstraction.
56
 But even if Rawls and his followers are understood 
thus, it does not follow that all normative theorizing need be practiced so. Normative 
theorizing can be understood simply as the unpacking and systematization of deeply 
held intuitions about morality. 
 Another problem with the critical ambitions of the advocates of contextualism 
goes beyond (and is much more important than) the dubiety of their critique of 
normative theory. The second problem is that even if the normative project could be 
so characterised—as the misguided attempt at generating moral principles from pure 
abstraction without considering the possibility that our evaluative concepts are 
radically contingent—it remains the case that there is nothing in the theoretical 
arsenal of contextualism that would pose any real threat to it. This is because there is 
nothing inherently critical about contextualism as a philosophy of history in the first 
place. Skinner’s main interpretive claim is that in order to be understood, the meaning 
of an utterance needs to be located within its particular linguistic context and that the 
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particularity of an utterance is related to the radical contingency of evaluative 
concepts. But even if this claim were thought sustainable, it does not necessarily 
provide any resources for, let alone entail, any kind of critical attitude to politics. 
There is no necessary connection between thinking about history or politics 
contextually on the one hand and thinking critically in the way Skinner, Palonen and 
Tully would like us to. Contextualist theorists of history need not be committed to any 
theory of politics in the same way as theorists of politics (contractarian, critical or 
otherwise) need not invoke any theory of history.
57
 Critical theorists are likely to 
bemoan the failure of normative theories to fully account for issues of micropower 
within any society and lament any belief that conceptual analysis of justice or rights 
provides a sufficient account of politics. At the same time, normative theorists are 
likely to bemoan the limitations of critical theories of politics, in particular their 
failure to acknowledge that ideas of justice and rights can only be dispensed with at 
the expense of rendering any critique hopelessly question-begging at the level of 
justification. Both sets of theorists might have a point, but it is hard to see how 
historical contextualism lends support, or has anything to say, to either.   
Not only does contextualism not necessarily lead us to critique, it may actually 
yield quite different, conservative political conclusions. Skinner assumes that 
contextualism, because it involves an encounter with beliefs that will necessarily be 
alien to us, will facilitate a ‘greater degree of understanding, and thereby a larger 
tolerance, for elements of cultural diversity’ and a more ‘self-critical’ attitude.
58
 But 
this requires something of a leap of faith. Why should we assume that intellectual 
encounters with alien belief systems from the past encourage people to be more 
tolerant rather than further entrench whatever prejudices they hold? The relationship 
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between contextualism and the sorts of political claims Skinner wishes to make is at 
best a contingent one. To say that contextualism gives us the opportunity to avoid 
being ‘bewitched’ by the supposedly hegemonic values of a particular society and to 
recognise their contingency can be seriously considerable only as an empirical claim. 
Any number of activities can enable us to recognise the contingency of our concepts 
and there seems no reason to privilege contextualist intellectual history in this regard 
over reading A Theory of Justice or hiking in the Canadian Rockies. 
 
Conclusion 
It seems almost certain that those familiar with the early methodological essays 
written by Skinner will have noted several changes in his recent writing. They might 
perhaps regard these changes as complementary to his recent work as a practising 
historian of ideas. But it is important to underscore that these are not merely changes 
in emphasis, style or presentation and not just a change in his interlocutors. 
Furthermore, they are not any clear repudiation of the claims for which his 
contextualism became best known and not any concession to his many critics. Rather, 
his recent writing demonstrates substantial developments in the way in which his 
contextualism is delineated and justified. In many respects, these developments jar 
with his previous writing and whether a coherent philosophy of history is retrievable 
from Regarding Method remains uncertain. What is certain is that Skinner has 
embraced anti-foundationalism and in doing so has presented his method as less about 
the treatment as texts as speech-acts and more about strategic rhetorical moves, 
designed to alter to the social and political world in which an actor exists.  
It remains unclear whether and how this anti-foundationalism has encouraged 
Skinner to follow others and try to recast contextualism as a distinct critical approach 
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to political philosophy. But regardless of the link between the two this recasting, as I 
suggested above, is unconvincing. Even if contextualism could be justified in terms of 
a method that outlines the necessary conditions of understanding, it cannot be 
successfully represented along the lines Skinner and others have suggested. Not only 
is contextualism incapable of being conceived as a fundamentally critical approach to 
politics, it is difficult to see how any philosophy of history could be understood in this 
way. Some extra work needs to be done to explain not only how it is possible to 
derive a critical approach to politics from a particularistic philosophy of history but 
also how it is possible to derive any theory of politics from philosophical assumptions 
about the nature of history. Past thinkers—most obviously Hegel and Marx—might 
have attempted such a derivation quite brazenly, but it is because their theorizing 
explicitly meshed assumptions about fact and value and did so in such a way that no 
contemporary philosophers could ever find convincing.   
